Counter-UAV

Options for protection against unmanned aerial vehicles

THE EXPANSION OF UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES REPRESENTS ONE OF THE MOST SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN THE NATURE OF ARMED CONFLICTS. WHILE TRADITIONAL AIR DEFENSE HAS BEEN FOCUSED PRIMARILY ON FIGHTING AIRCRAFT AND CRUISE MISSILES FOR DECADES, THE CURRENT BATTLEFIELD IS INCREASINGLY BEING FILLED WITH A WIDE RANGE OF UNMANNED SYSTEMS

The war in Ukraine, conflicts in the Middle East and combat operations in Nagorno-Karabakh have shown that UAVs today fulfill not only the original tasks of reconnaissance, but also fire guidance, electronic warfare, logistical support and direct offensive operations. In addition to large systems of the MALE and HALE categories, small commercial drones and FPV systems capable of destroying armoured vehicles or infrastructure at minimal cost have become significantly widespread.

The logical outcome of the widespread use of unmanned aerial vehicles is the fundamental need to build effective systems referred to as Counter-UAV (C-UAV), i.e. capable of detecting, identifying, tracking and neutralizing unmanned aerial vehicles.

Although the C-UAV capability is often presented as a completely new area of warfare, in essence it represents the next evolutionary stage of air defense. The basic principles of protection against air threats remain virtually unchanged. Each air defence system must be able to detect, identify, track, decide on the way to react and then neutralize the threat. What is changing fundamentally is not the principle of defense itself, but the technology that allows the individual phases of this process to be implemented faster, more accurately and on a larger scale than ever before.

The advent of unmanned aerial vehicles does not represent a change in the decision-making cycle itself. However, it brings a significant increase in the number of targets, a reduction in reaction times and a dramatic increase in the complexity of the decision-making process. While a traditional air defense battery could track a limited number of high-value targets, a modern unit can simultaneously face tens or hundreds of cheap unmanned aerial vehicles of various types.

C-UAV as part of a multi-layered defense

One of the most important findings of recent years is the fact that the C-UAV cannot be understood as an isolated capability. Today, the modern battlefield includes the simultaneous operation of manned aircraft and helicopters, cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, interception munitions, FPV drones and reconnaissance unmanned aerial vehicles. From the defender’s point of view, these are only different types of air threats requiring different sensors and effectors, but not a different principle of defense.

That is why today there is an effort to integrate C-UAV assets into existing air defense structures instead of building separate systems.

The most significant change in drone protection in the detection phase is the rapid development of sensor technologies. Traditional radar systems have been optimized for tracking aircraft and helicopters with a relatively large radar reflector

area. However, small drones pose a completely different problem. Therefore, modern C-UAV systems use a multi-sensor approach combining active radars, passive radio reconnaissance, electro-optical sensors, infrared systems, acoustic sensors and radio communication detection systems.

A key trend is the transition from individual sensors to fusion, where data from different sources is automatically merged into a unified operational picture. This will achieve a higher probability of detection, but especially a significant reduction in false alarms, which are one of the main problems of current systems.

Despite the progress in the development of sensors, it is necessary to take into account the specifics of the use of unmanned aerial vehicles. The first and essential is the flight altitude. Drones are much better than manned vehicles, they can use hidden flight behind natural obstacles and can easily operate in urban areas. In the conditions of Europe, we must also take into account the significant number of drones used both by amateurs and by the expanding industrial segment.

The accelerator in the decision-making process is the use of artificial intelligence. Its technological benefit does not lie in replacing humans, but in speeding up individual steps in detecting and eliminating drones.

Today, artificial intelligence algorithms can automatically identify the type of unmanned aerial vehicle, predict the flight trajectory, determine the threat level, design the optimal effector, and prioritize targets during swarm attacks. Gradually, the decision-making cycle is being shortened from minutes to seconds and in some cases to fractions of seconds. It is the speed of decision-making that is becoming the main factor in the success of future C-UAV systems.

Who is responsible for C-UAV?

The massive development of unmanned aerial vehicles has raised not only the need for new sensors and effectors, but also fundamental questions regarding organization, command and responsibility for protection against air threats.

One of the most debated issues today is the determination of responsibility for the C-UAV area. There are three basic approaches:

A centralized model where the capabilities of C-UAVs are concentrated under the command of air defense or air forces. The advantage is unified command, standardization and efficient use of sensor networks. The disadvantage may be the limited ability to respond to the immediate needs of front-line units.

A decentralized model in which C-UAV capabilities are an organic part of ground troops. Brigades, battalions or even companies have their own sensors and electronic warfare means. This model offers high flexibility, but at the cost of more complex coordination and the risk of fragmentation of capabilities.

Hybrid model. Therefore, more and more armies are moving towards a hybrid solution, in which strategic sensors and command systems are centralized, while means of immediate protection are allocated directly to combat units. It is this model that best suits the character of the current battlefield.

The position of air defence within the ground forces is also undergoing an interesting development. In the past, protection against air threats was often perceived as a support activity similar to logistics, engineering security or liaison support. The main task was to create conditions for the operation of maneuver units. However, experience from Ukraine shows that protection against unmanned aerial vehicles is no longer just a supporting function. Without the ability to counter reconnaissance and strike drones, it becomes virtually impossible to carry out troop movements, logistical operations, force concentration, or attack conduct. Today, the survival of a unit is directly dependent on the level of its protection against unmanned aerial vehicles. Therefore, the C-UAV is gradually transforming from a support capability into one of the key combat functions of modern armed forces.

The direction of NATO and future armed forces

The current development in the North Atlantic Alliance is aimed at integrating all air defence assets into a unified Integrated Air and Missile Defence (IAMD) system, in which the decisive factor will no longer be the affiliation to individual types of troops, but the ability to share data and coordinate operations across domains. Future structures are likely to be characterized by a centralized operational picture of the air situation, decentralized use of effectors, integration of C-UAVs into all levels of command, interconnection of air defense and electronic warfare systems, and the use of artificial intelligence for decision support.

New professional specialization

When discussing the development of C-UAV capabilities, attention is usually focused on sensors, effectors, artificial intelligence and new technologies. However, history shows that the limiting factor for future systems may not be the technology itself, but the availability of qualified personnel. This is because C-UAVs create a completely new category of specialists who combine knowledge of several traditionally separate areas of air defense, radar reconnaissance, electronic warfare, cyber operations, unmanned systems, data analytics and artificial intelligence.

Therefore, the future C-UAV operator will not only be an operator of a specific system, but will have to understand the entire air threat environment and be able to work in a networked command and control system. This raises the question of whether these capabilities will be concentrated only in the military, or whether it will be necessary to create a wider national ecosystem of experts.

Who will be responsible for the proceedings?

Unlike traditional aerial threats, small drones pose a problem not only for the armed forces, but also for operators of critical infrastructure, airports, energy companies, state administration, security forces or organizers of major public events. In addition, many UAV incidents take place outside crisis situations and military areas. Therefore, one of the biggest challenges of the future will be to determine responsibility for the management of the UAV protection system. For example, in the Czech Republic, competences are currently divided between several institutions: the Ministries of Defence and the Interior, the army, the police, the Civil Aviation Authority, the Critical Infrastructure Manager, and the intelligence services.

Thus, in the event of a large-scale incident or crisis situation, there may be overlapping responsibilities and confusion in decision-making. Therefore, we can expect a gradual search for a model that clearly states:

– who is responsible for detection;

– who creates the common operational picture;

– who issues the decision on intervention;

– who coordinates the different components;

– who is responsible for the protection of critical infrastructure.

The question logically arises as to whether protection against unmanned aerial vehicles should not be built as part of a broader national resilience system, similar to cyber security or crisis management. Such a system would make it possible to connect military, security and civilian capacities and create a unified framework for the protection of airspace in times of peace, crisis and armed conflict. In this concept, the C-UAV would not only be a task of the air defense of the Army of the Czech Republic, but a joint responsibility of the state, its security forces and operators of critical infrastructure.

Building C-UAV capabilities in the Czech Republic

The area of protection against unmanned aerial vehicles represents a specific challenge for the Czech Republic, resulting from both geographical conditions and the structure of current air defence. In the public debate, attention is often focused primarily on the means of destroying drones, i.e. the last stage of the decision-making process. From a military point of view, however, its first stage, i.e. early detection, identification and tracking of the target, poses a much bigger problem. It is the ability to create a sufficiently accurate and up-to-date picture of the air situation that will represent one of the most challenging tasks of the future development of air defence in our conditions.

Our country is characterized by rugged terrain, which includes mountainous areas, extensive forest complexes, valleys and densely built-up areas. These geographical conditions create a significant amount of radar shadows and areas with limited detection of low-flying targets. As in other NATO countries, it will therefore be necessary to build another layer of specialized sensors aimed precisely at detecting small unmanned aerial vehicles.

Another specificity of the Czech Republic lies in the extent of buildings that would require protection in the event of a crisis or armed conflict. In addition to military bases, these are mainly airports, power plants, transmission systems, communication nodes, logistics centers, strategic stockpile warehouses, state administration and command buildings. It is not realistic to assume that all of them will be permanently protected by specialized C-UAV systems. Therefore, the defense will have to use the principle of prioritization of protected objects and dynamic allocation of resources according to the current threat.

The key prerequisite for success will not be the acquisition of new sensors or effectors themselves, but their integration into the unified IAMD air and missile defense system, which will connect sensors, command and control systems, electronic warfare assets and individual effectors across all levels of command. Only in this way will it be possible to make efficient use of limited resources and prevent the emergence of parallel systems providing a different picture of the situation.

At the same time, building the capabilities of C-UAVs represents a long-term commitment with significant financial implications. Given the speed of technological development, a one-off acquisition cannot be expected to create a capability that can be used for several decades, but it will require continuous modernization and associated with rapid adaptation to new threats.

The dynamically developing field of unmanned aerial vehicles and defense against them will be one of the topics of the Future Air Force Conference 2026, which will take place in Prague from 20 to 22 October. More information about it can be found at www.futureairforce.cz.

Author: Col.(ret.) Petr Tichý